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Abstract
This study introduces nancial intermediaries into the Schumpeterian growth model
developed by Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). They collect deposits from
households, provide funds for entrepreneurial projects, and monitor the entrepreneurs.
I consider an economy with moral hazard problems: entrepreneurs can hide the result of
a successful innovation and thereby avoid repaying nancial intermediaries if the latter
do not monitor entrepreneurial performance. I analyze the eects of nancial interme-
diaries' activities on technological progress and economic growth in such an economy. I
show that nancial intermediaries need to monitor entrepreneurs in an economy where
the legal protection of creditors is not strong enough. Such monitoring can resolve the
moral hazard problem; however, it does not always promote technological innovation,
because it could increase the cost of entrepreneurial innovation and thus reduce the
amount invested for innovation. I also examine how monitoring by nancial intermedi-
aries aects the welfare of individuals through the stringency of nancial markets.
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1 Introduction
The idea that the nancial sector plays an important role in economic growth is traced
back to Schumpeter (1911). He argues that the following services of nancial intermediaries
are essential for technological innovation and economic development: mobilizing savings,
evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions. His
argument has induced many studies, especially empirical ones, on nance and growth. For
instance, Goldsmith (1969) and King and Levine (1993a) study the empirical link between
nancial development and economic growth.1 Levine (2005) surveys theoretical and empiri-
cal studies on nance and economic growth. He indicates that the functions provided by the
nancial system may inuence savings and investment decisions and thus economic growth.2
This study focuses on one of the nancial functions, that is, monitoring entrepreneurial per-
formance.3 Monitoring of entrepreneurs by nancial intermediaries can resolve the moral
hazard problem where entrepreneurs hide the result of a successful innovation and thereby
avoid repaying the nancial intermediaries. Several studies examine this nancial function,
but many of them are static and not suitable for analyzing the eects of nancial interme-
1King and Levine (1993a) build on Goldsmith (1969). They use data on 80 countries over the 1960{1989
period, whereas Goldsmith (1969) uses data on about 35 countries over the period 1860{1963. Moreover,
King and Levine (1993a) construct additional measures of the level of nancial development.
2Levine (2005) indicates the following functions provided by the nancial system: (i) production of ex
ante information about possible investments, (ii) monitoring of investments and the implications of corporate
governance, (iii) trading, diversication, and management of risk, (iv) mobilization and pooling of savings,
and (v) exchange of goods and services. Laeven, Levine, and Michalopoulos (2009, 2015) and Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990) focus on function (i) and analyze the eects of the nancial system on economic growth.
King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) study the eect of nancial systems on
technological change and economic growth from functions (iii),(iv), and (v).
3This study focuses on only ex ante monitoring, and not on corporate governance. As for corporate
governance, Bencivenga and Smith (1993) show that the activities of nancial intermediaries that improve
corporate governance boost economic growth.
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diaries on economic growth in the long run.4 Thus, I develop a Schumpeterian endogenous
growth model where nancial intermediaries monitor investments and their monitoring may
aect economic growth in an economy with moral hazard problems.
I consider an economy with asymmetric information; borrowers have an incentive to cheat
because lenders cannot observe their activities once the lenders supply them funds. I in-
troduce nancial intermediaries who can monitor the activities of entrepreneurs in a multi-
sector Schumpeterian growth model with asymmetric information. Aghion, Howitt, and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005) introduce imperfect credit markets based on asymmetric information
in a multi-sector Schumpeterian growth model. However, their model does not focus on
the activities of nancial intermediaries. Thus, this study provides a model of monitoring
by nancial intermediaries in contrast to Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes' (2005) model
where there is no nancial intermediaries.
The goal of this study is to develop a simple Schumpeterian growth model with nan-
cial intermediaries who collect deposits from households, provide funds for entrepreneurial
projects, and monitor the borrowers, and to analyze the eects of activities of the nancial
intermediaries on technological innovation and economic growth in an economy with moral
hazard problems.
My model is based on Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), which considers an
economy with asymmetric information where borrowers do not repay their obligations but
pay a cost to hide their true revenues, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989).5 In this study,
I construct a model with moral hazard problems induced by entrepreneurs, following the
idea of a hidden cost in Aghion et al. (2005). Moreover, I incorporate the idea of a private
benet, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). In Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), a moral hazard
4Boyd and Smith (1994) consider how a debt contract can lower the monitoring costs, but their framework
is static. Diamond (1984) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) focus on the link between the level of monitored
nance and the level of investment, but their frameworks are also static.
5The cost is called a hidden cost in Bernanke and Gertler (1989); it is taken as the degree of creditor
protection in Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
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problem exists in that borrowers can obtain a private benet by not managing their project
diligently. They show that in an economy with the moral hazard problem, the monitoring
level can aect aggregate production and alleviate the moral hazard; however, their model is
static and thus cannot analyze the eects of monitoring on economic growth in the long run.
Therefore, one of the contributions of this study is examining a similar issue in a dynamic
framework, that is, lower monitoring cost; in other words, this study examines whether higher
monitoring technology of nancial intermediaries can accelerate economic growth by lowering
the cost of raising funds for entrepreneurs. I also show that in an economy where the legal
protection of creditors is suciently high, nancial intermediaries do not have to monitor
entrepreneurs, and the equilibrium level of innovation in this economy is the same as in the
economy with no moral hazard problems.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of
the model. In Section 3, I rst consider an economy without moral hazard problems as the
benchmark, and then an economy with moral hazard problems. The section analyzes the link
between legal protection of the creditor and the role of nancial intermediaries. The eects
of nancial intermediaries' monitoring on economic growth are also analyzed. Section 4
shows the results of Section 3 graphically and provides their implications. Section 5 performs
welfare analyses. Concluding remarks are oered in Section 6.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
I develop a discrete-time multi-sector Schumpeterian growth model where nancial inter-
mediaries collect deposits from households, provide funds for entrepreneurial projects, and
6One of the studies examining the legal system and nancial development is La Porta et al. (2000);
the study takes the view that dierences in the legal system are the fundamental source of international
dierences in nancial development.
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monitor the entrepreneurs. The model has the same basic structure as Aghion, Howitt, and
Mayer-Foulkes' (2005) Schumpeterian growth model in a discrete-time framework, except
that the monitoring activities of nancial intermediaries is incorporated. Aghion, Howitt,
and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) consider a nancial market, but they do not consider the activities
of nancial intermediaries. I assume a small open economy consisting of a continuum of
individuals: households, entrepreneurs, and nancial intermediaries.7 Each individual lives
for two periods.
Households are endowed with one unit of labor, which is inelastically supplied to the nal
goods sector in the rst period. They have a xed population size L, which is normalized to 1;
save by having deposits with nancial intermediaries in the rst period; and consume the nal
goods in both periods. I give a more detailed explanation of household behavior in Section
2.6. Entrepreneurs are born with entrepreneurial ideas in the rst period. However, only one
entrepreneur's idea per sector has a positive probability of producing a successful innovation
and improving the production technology in the second period. In each intermediate goods
sector, the entrepreneur who has such an innovative idea can raise funds for investment in
the rst period. Entrepreneurs who can successfully innovate have an advantage over those
who cannot, in that they can produce an intermediate good at a lower cost compared to the
others. Thus, successful entrepreneurs can earn monopolistic prots in the second period.
Financial intermediaries collect deposits from households and provide funds for innovative
activities in the rst period. There is a moral hazard problem in that entrepreneurs can make
the following decisions after availing funds from the nancial intermediaries: rst, whether to
use all the funds obtained from nancial intermediaries for investment or not; second, whether
to repay the nancial intermediaries or not.8 Thus, nancial intermediaries must monitor the
7In Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), there are m countries. They focus on the process of
technology transfer; however, I focus on the eect of the nancial intermediaries' monitoring on growth
rather than the eect of technological transfer on growth.
8Entrepreneurs can hide their revenue by paying a certain cost. This cost is called a hidden cost in
Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
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entrepreneurs and thereby alleviate the moral hazard problem. In the following subsections,
I consider in detail the nal goods sector, the intermediate goods sector, households, and the
nancial sector respectively.
2.2 Final Goods Sector
Final goods, Zt, are produced from labor and a continuum of specialized intermediate goods
according to the following production function:
Zt = L
1 
Z 1
0
A1 i;t x

i;tdi;  2 (0; 1); (1)
where xi;t is the input for intermediate good i in period t, and Ai;t is the level of technology
of the intermediate goods sector i in period t. L represents labor supply, which is normalized
to 1. The nal good, Zt, is used for both consumption and as an input for the production of
intermediate goods.
I use the nal good as the numeraire. The nal good is produced under perfect competition.
Thus, the price of each intermediate good, pi;t, is equal to its marginal product:
pi;t = 

Ai;t
xi;t
1 
: (2)
2.3 Intermediate Goods Sector
For each intermediate goods sector i, an entrepreneur born in period t-1 can successfully
innovate and produce an intermediate good in the next period, t. Let i;t be the probability
that an entrepreneur successfully innovates. Then, the level of technology of intermediate
goods sector i in period t, Ai;t, becomes
Ai;t =
8><>: At with probability i;tAi;t 1 with probability 1  i;t
9>=>; ; (3)
where At is the world technology frontier. I assume that At > Ai;t 1 for all i; t. The world
technology frontier grows at a constant rate g > 0.
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If an entrepreneur can successfully innovate, she will produce an intermediate good with
technology that can transform one unit of the nal good into one unit of intermediate good.
This entrepreneur is called a successful innovator. Entrepreneurs who do not innovate can
produce an intermediate good but incur a higher cost of production. They need  units of
the nal good to produce one unit of the intermediate good. I assume that 1

>  > 1.
In all intermediate goods sectors, there exists an unlimited number of entrepreneurs|the
competitive fringe|capable of producing the intermediate good at the unit cost of . Then,
each successful innovator does not charge more than  in equilibrium in order to prevent
the competitive fringe from entering the intermediate goods market. Thus, each successful
innovator charges  and can enjoy the cost-of-production advantage.9
Each successful innovator becomes a monopoly in her intermediate goods sector. She
charges a price equal to the unit cost of the competitive fringe, , and earns monopoly
prots for one period.10 In the intermediate goods sector where innovation is unsuccessful,
production will occur under perfect competition, and so the price will be equal to the unit
cost of the competitive fringe, , and the unsuccessful innovators earns zero prot. Thus, in
each intermediate goods sector, the price of the intermediate good pi;t becomes
pi;t = ; 8i: (4)
From (4) and (2), the quantity demanded for intermediate good i becomes
xi;t =



 1
1 
Ai;t; 8i: (5)
9The condition for innovators to enjoy the cost of production advantage is the following limit-price con-
straint: pi;t  
10In the absence of a competitive fringe, when 1 < , each successful innovator charges a price equal to
1
 .
However, when 1 >  > 1, each successful innovator is forced to charge the limit price  in order to prevent
entry by the fringe, as in Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Aghion and Howitt (2009, chapter
4).
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Thus, the prot of entrepreneurs in the intermediate goods sector i, i;t, can be given by
i;t =
8>><>>:
pi;txi;t   xi;t = (  1)



 1
1 
Ai;t = At, if successful;
pi;txi;t   xi;t = 0, if unsuccessful;
(6)
where  = (  1)



 1
1 
and  2  1; 1


. 11
2.4 Aggregate Behavior
This subsection aggregates economic activities. I dene the average level of technological
productivity, At, as
At =
Z 1
0
Ai;tdi: (7)
Substituting (5) and (7) into production function (1), the aggregate output becomes
Zt =



 
1 
At: (8)
Since perfect competition prevails in the nal goods sector, the wage rate, wt, is equal to the
marginal product of labor in producing the nal good, and is proportional to At:
wt = (1  )Zt = At, where  = (1  )



 
1 
: (9)
In equilibrium, the probability of successful innovation is the same across sectors: i;t = t
for all i. Therefore, the law of motion of average productivity becomes
At = tAt + (1  t)At 1: (10)
Equation (10) reveals that the average technological productivity of an economy in period t
is a weighted average of the t sectors that implement the world frontier technology, At, and
the 1  t sectors that use the average technology in period t-1, At 1.
I dene technology gap as the distance from the world technology frontier:12
at  At
At
: (11)
11Note that Ai;t = At if innovation is successful, from (3).
12The denition of "technology gap" is the same as that in Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006), Aghion,
Howitt, and Myer-Foulkes (2005), and Laeven, Levine, and Michalopoulos (2009, 2015).
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This denition implies that as at approaches 1, the economy's average technology, At, is
closed to the world technology frontier, At.
13 From (10) and (11), the technology gap evolves
according to
at = t +

1  t
1 + g

at 1; (12)
where g is the growth rate of the world frontier technology, At.
2.5 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries are born with endowment !f > 0 in period t-1. Their net worth
in period t-1, N ft 1, is equal to their endowment, !
f . In other words, N ft 1 = !
f obtains
in period t-1. It is assumed that !f is not enough to provide funds for the entrepreneurs
and monitor them, and so nancial intermediaries need to collect deposits from households.
After they collect deposits from the households, they invest their own net worth as well as the
deposits received by providing funds for the entrepreneurs who have a positive probability of
innovation or by holding risk-free assets.14 Thus, their balance sheet condition can be given
by
Lft 1 +Bt 1 = Dt 1 +N
f
t 1; (13)
where Lft 1 is the amount of funds lent to the entrepreneurs in period t-1, Bt 1 is the amount
of risk-free asset holdings, Dt 1 is the amount of deposits received in period t-1, and N
f
t 1 is
their own net worth. If the nancial intermediaries provide funds Lft 1 for the entrepreneurs
in period t-1, the successful innovators pay them tR
f
t L
f
t 1 in period t.
15 If the nancial
intermediaries hold risk-free assets Bt 1 in period t-1, they would have (1 + r)Bt 1 assets in
period t.
13Note that at 2 [0; 1].
14I assume a small open economy, and so nancial intermediaries can invest abroad at the rate of return,
r, which is given.
15Note that t is the proportion of sectors where innovation is successful and nancial intermediaries agree
not to claim payment if the entrepreneurs, that is, the borrowers, fail to innovate.
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Since the nancial market and world capital market are ecient, nancial intermediaries
would require that the expected return rate on funds provided to entrepreneurs be equal to
the return rate on their risk-free asset holdings in case there is no moral hazard problem.
Thus, the no-arbitrage condition in an economy with no moral hazard problem can be given
by
tR
f
t = 1 + r: (14)
I consider the following moral hazard problem. Entrepreneurs who are provided with funds
may cheat the nancial intermediaries by not repaying the loan once they successfully in-
novate. This moral hazard problem can be resolved if nancial intermediaries monitor the
entrepreneurs; however, it costs mLft 1 to monitor entrepreneurs when the nancial interme-
diaries lend them Lft 1.
16
Let  = f0; 1g be the probability that nancial intermediaries can obtain repayment. If the
nancial intermediaries monitor the borrowers, they obtain repayment with the probability
 = 1. Otherwise, they obtain repayment with the probability 0.
If nancial intermediaries monitor the borrowers, since both the nancial market and world
capital market are ecient, the markets would require that the expected return rate on funds
provided for the entrepreneurs,

tR
f
t L
f
t 1 Lft 1 mLft 1
Lft 1

, be equal to the return rate on the
risk-free asset holdings,

(1+r)Bt 1 Bt 1
Bt 1

. In equilibrium,  = 1 if nancial intermediaries
monitor the borrowers. Thus, the no-arbitrage condition in an economy with the moral
hazard problem and nancial intermediaries' monitoring can be given by
tR
f
t = 1 + r +m: (15)
Because of perfect competition between nancial intermediaries, the following zero-prot
conditions hold:
tR
f
t L
f
t 1 + (1 + r)Bt 1  RdtDt 1 = 0, if no monitoring; (16)
16I assume that if nancial intermediaries monitor the entrepreneurs, the entrepreneurs who successfully
innovate are forced to repay them.
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tR
f
t L
f
t 1 + (1 + r)

Bt 1  mLft 1

 RdtDt 1 = 0, if monitoring: (17)
If nancial intermediaries decide to monitor the entrepreneurs in period t-1, they have to
borrow the monitoring cost, mLft 1, in the world capital market in period t-1, and repay
(1 + r)mLft 1 in period t.
17
If the nancial intermediaries do not monitor the entrepreneurs, the balance sheet condition
(13), the no-arbitrage condition (14), and the zero-prot condition (16) yield the following
gross return for deposits, Rdt :
Rdt = (1 + r)
 
1 +
N ft 1
Dt 1
!
: (18)
If the nancial intermediaries do monitor the entrepreneurs, the balance sheet condition (13),
the no-arbitrage condition (15), and the zero-prot condition (17) yield the following gross
return for deposits, Rdt :
Rdt = (1 + r)
 
1 +
N ft 1
Dt 1
!
  rm
 
Lft 1
Dt 1
!
: (19)
Assume the following rule of the lending to net worth ratio,
Lft 1
Nft 1
:18
1 + r
rm
>
Lft 1
N ft 1
: (20)
2.6 Households
The economy is populated by a xed number L of identical households, and L is normalized
to 1. The households live for two periods, and are endowed with one unit of labor, which is
supplied inelastically in the rst period. The households consume the nal goods in the rst
and second periods, with the following utility function:
U = lnCyt 1 +  lnC
o
t ; (21)
17Since I assume a small open economy, the risk-free rate, r, is exogenous.
18Under rule (20), the return for deposits determined by (19) is larger than 1 + r, which is the return on
risk-free asset holdings. Then, households can save only by having deposits with nancial intermediaries,
whether or not the nancial intermediaries monitor the entrepreneurs. For the derivation of (19) and (20),
see Appendix A.
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where Cyt 1 and C
o
t denote the consumption of the nal goods in the rst and second periods
respectively, and  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor.19 They save by having deposits Dt 1 with
nancial intermediaries, who pay them a certain gross return Rdt .
20 Each household born in
period t-1 can choose to consume in the rst and second periods, Cyt 1 and C
o
t , respectively,
and have deposit Dt 1 to maximize the above utility function subject to the following budget
constraints:
Cyt 1 +Dt 1 = wt 1; (22)
Cot = R
d
tDt 1: (23)
The rst-order condition of the household's maximization problem is
Dt 1 =


1 + 

wt 1: (24)
Using (9), I can rewrite (24) as
Dt 1 =


1 + 

At 1: (25)
3 Innovation
The probability of an entrepreneur successfully innovating in period t, t, depends on the
amount of funds invested in innovation during period t-1 :21
Ni;t 1 = (i;t)
 At: (26)
Here, Ni;t 1 is the amount of funds invested in innovation during period t-1 : that is, the
demand for funds;  is a parameter reecting the institutional and other characteristics that
aect the cost of innovation at every level of technology; and  is the inverse of the R&D
19The utility function is specied to be of log-utility type, since it is tractable for analyses.
20In equilibrium, Rdt > 1+ r, implying that the households cannot access the world capital market and can
save only by having deposits.
21Formulation (26) is based on Laeven, Levine, and Michalopoulos(2009, 2015).
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investment elasticity with  > 1.22 Function (26) implies that the higher the world technology
frontier, At, the more dicult it is to innovate, as in Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes
(2005).
3.1 Equilibrium Innovation without Moral Hazard
In this subsection, I consider an economy that has no moral hazard problems. To put it
in another way, all the entrepreneurs in this economy decide not to privately use the funds
borrowed from nancial intermediaries and therefore repay the nancial intermediaries.23
In this economy, each entrepreneur whose idea has a positive probability of successful
innovation chooses the amount of R&D investment Ni;t 1 to maximize her expected prots
ei;t in intermediate goods sector i :
max
Ni;t 1
ei;t = i;t

At  RftNi;t 1

; (27)
where
i;t =

1


Ni;t 1
At
 1

: (28)
The rst term in the parentheses in (27), At, gives the monopolistic prots of producing
an intermediate good. The second term, RftNi;t 1, gives the amount that she has to pay the
nancial intermediary. The corresponding rst-order condition yields
Ni;t 1
At

=


1 + 

1
Rft

: (29)
Equation (29) implies that any increase in the cost of raising funds, Rft , reduces the R&D
investment, Ni;t 1. Because of (28), Equation (29) can be rewritten as follows:
i;t =

1



1 + 
 1


1
Rft
 1

: (30)
22This assumption,  > 1, implies that the marginal productivity of investment on innovation gradually
decreases.
23In this subsection, I consider a perfect nancial market where entrepreneurs can borrow unlimited quan-
tities from nancial intermediaries.
12
In equilibrium, the cost of raising funds becomes the same across sectors: Rfi;t = R
f
t for all i.
Thus, the probability of innovation becomes the same across sectors: i;t = t for all i. The
equilibrium return for lending, Rf, is determined so as to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition
(14) and the entrepreneur's optimization condition (30). Thus, I obtain
Rf =

(1 + )

 1
 1
: (31)
By substituting Rf into optimization conditions (29) and (30), I obtain the equilibrium
amount of R&D investment Nt 1 and the equilibrium probability of successful innovation 

as follows: 
Nt 1
At

=


(1 + )
 
 1
; (32)
 =


(1 + )
 1
 1
; (33)
where it is assumed that  < (1 + ) in order to ensure that  2 (0; 1). In equilibrium,
the entrepreneur's prots, et , can be written as
et = 


(1 + )
 1
 1
At


1 + 

= At


1 + 

: (34)
From (33) and (12), the technology gap in this economy with no moral hazard evolves
according to
at = 
 +

1  
1 + g

at 1  H1(at 1); (35)
where at converges in the long run to the steady state:
a =
(1 + g)
g + 
2 (0; 1): (36)
3.2 Equilibrium Innovation with Moral Hazard
In this subsection, I describe an economy that has moral hazard problems. Assume that after
the entrepreneurs are provided with funds for R&D investment by nancial intermediaries,
they can decide whether to use all the funds, Lft 1, for investment, or whether to privately use
13
a part of the funds, qLft 1, q 2 (0; 1).24 Specically, if their innovation is unsuccessful, they
obtain the funds left for themselves, qLft 1, in period t.
25 If their innovation is successful,
they use the funds left for themselves in period t-1, qLft 1, to hide the result of their successful
innovation. In this economy, I assume that entrepreneurs can hide the result of a successful
innovation and avoid repaying the nancial intermediaries in period t if they can pay the
cost for it, qLft 1. Hereafter, I call this cost a hidden cost.
26 I assume that parameter q is
given by the legal system for creditor protection.
Assume that the credit market is perfect. Now, the following equation must hold in equi-
librium: Lft 1 = N

t 1. Let N^t 1 be the amount of investment when entrepreneurs privately
use a part of the funds, that is, N^t 1 = (1  q)Nt 1. Furthermore, let ^t be the probability of
successful innovation when they invest N^t 1 in period t-1. Then, the incentive compatibility
constraint that induces the entrepreneurs to be honest is given by
 (1  ^t) qNt 1 + ^tAt  et : (37)
The right-hand side of (37) is equal to Equation (34), which gives the entrepreneurs' expected
prots in equilibrium when there is no moral hazard problem and they use all the funds for
investment. The left-hand side of (37) is the entrepreneurs' expected prots when they do
not use all the funds for investment in period t-1. The rst term on the left-hand side of (37)
implies the entrepreneurs' expected benet when their innovation is unsuccessful in period
t,27 while the second term of the left-hand side of (37) implies the entrepreneurs' expected
benet when their innovation is successful and they earn monopolistic prots but do not
24When entrepreneurs privately use a part of the funds, the amount of investments decrease. From (26),
the probability of successful innovation when they privately use a part of the funds is lower than that when
they use all the funds for investments.
25This assumption of private benet is based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
26This assumption of a hidden cost is based on Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Aghion, Howitt, and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
27Note that  is a discount factor, (1  ^t) is the probability of unsuccessful innovation when the amount
of investment is N^t 1, and qNt 1 is a private benet.
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repay the nancial intermediaries in period t.28
From (26), (32), (33), and (34), Equation (37) can be rewritten as
q

1  (1  q) 1

 + (1  q) 1 (1 + )  : (IC)
(IC) is satised when q is close to 1, because  > 1 and  < 1.29 When q is close to 1,
entrepreneurs can divert a larger part of funds, but since the hidden cost is high, they lose
the incentive to divert. An increase in q has two eects: one, it increases the private benet
the entrepreneurs obtain when their innovation is unsuccessful, and two, it increases the
hidden cost to be dishonest when their innovation is successful. Since entrepreneurs use a
large part of funds privately and the quantities of investment decrease when q is close to 1,
the probability of successful innovation decreases. Therefore, the latter eect is larger than
the former eect and they lose the incentive to use funds privately when q is close to 1. The
following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1 The case in which legal protection is suciently high:
If the degree of creditor protection is suciently high, that is, the hidden cost q is close
to 1, nancial intermediaries do not need to monitor the entrepreneurs since the incentive
constraint is satised. The equilibrium in this case is the same as that in the economy with no
moral hazard problem. Consequently, if the degree of creditor protection is suciently high,
that is, the hidden cost q is close to 1, the amount of investment, the probability of successful
innovation, the dynamics of technology gap, and the steady state of the technology gap in the
28Note that ^t is the probability of successful innovation when the amount of investment is N^t 1 and At
represents the monopolistic prots given by (6).
29When q is close to 1, the left-hand side of (IC) is close to  and the right-hand side of (IC) is . Note
that  > 1 and  < 1. Now, the incentive compatibility condition is satised when q is close to 1. On the
other hand, when q is close to 0, the left-hand side of (IC) is close to 1+ and the right-hand side of (IC) is .
Because the left-side of (IC) is strictly larger than the right-hand side, the incentive compatibility condition
is not satised when q is close to 0.
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equilibrium with no monitoring are, respectively,
Nt 1
At

=


(1 + )
 
 1
; (32)
 =


(1 + )
 1
 1
; (33)
at = 
 +

1  
1 + g

at 1  H1(at 1); (35)
a =
(1 + g)
g + 
2 (0; 1): (36)
I next consider the case where the degree of creditor protection is not suciently high,
that is, q is close to 0. In order to enable nancial intermediaries monitor the entrepreneurs,
the following inequality must hold:
tR
f
t L
f
t 1  mLft 1  0: (38)
This inequality implies that nancial intermediaries have an incentive to monitor when the
return on lending as promised is larger than the cost of monitoring. Thus, inequality (38)
is satised for all m, since the no-arbitrage condition (15) is satised in equilibrium. The
maximization problem for entrepreneurs under monitoring by nancial intermediaries is the
same as that under no monitoring by nancial intermediaries in (27). Thus, in this case, the
optimizing conditions for entrepreneurs are the same as in (29) and (30). In equilibrium, the
probability of innovation is the same across all sectors: i;t = t for all i ; the no-arbitrage
condition (15) holds; and the entrepreneurs' optimization condition (30) is satised. Thus,
the return for lending, eRf , in the equilibrium with monitoring can be given by
eRf = (1 + m)  1 (1 + )

 1
 1
= (1 + m)

 1Rf: (39)
Equation (39) implies that this equilibrium return for lending, eRf , is higher than that with
no monitoring, Rf.30 This result comes from the no-arbitrage condition (15). Moreover, as
the monitoring cost, m, increases, this equilibrium return for lending, eRf , increases as well.
30Note that Rf is given by (31).
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By substituting eRf into the optimization conditions (29) and (30), I can obtain the equi-
librium amount of R&D investment, eNt 1, and the equilibrium probability of successful
innovation, ~, as follows: 31 eNt 1
At
!
= (1 + m)
 
 1


(1 + )
 
 1
= (1 + m)
 
 1
Nt 1
At
; (40)
e = (1 + m)  1 1  
(1 + )
 1
 1
= (1 + m)
 1
 1: (41)
I obtain the second equality of (40) from (32) and the second equality of (41) from (33). In
the equilibrium with monitoring, the entrepreneur's prots, eet , is
eet = ~At 1 + 

: (42)
From (41) and (12), in the economy with no moral hazard, the technology gap evolves
according to
at = ~+

1  ~
1 + g

at 1  H2(at 1); (43)
where at converges in the long run to the following steady state:
~a =
(1 + g)~
g + ~
2 (0; 1): (44)
The following property establishes those of the steady-state technology gap when nancial
intermediaries monitor the entrepreneurs.
Proposition 2 The technology gap in an economy with monitoring at 1 converges to the
steady state ~a, which is always less than a.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that monitoring by nancial intermediaries can enforce repayment when innovation
is successful, but there remains the moral hazard problem that entrepreneurs may privately
use a part of the funds to obtain a private benet when their innovation is unsuccessful.
31Since I assume that  < (1 + ) so that  2 (0; 1) and m > 0, I ensure that e 2 [0; 1).
17
Nevertheless, in the equilibrium with monitoring, no moral hazard problems arise. The
following proposition summarizes this argument.32
Proposition 3 The case in which legal protection is not suciently high:
If the degree of creditor protection is not suciently high, that is, the hidden cost q is close
to 0, monitoring by nancial intermediaries removes all moral hazard problems. In the equi-
librium with monitoring, entrepreneurs have no incentive to privately use a part of the funds
even if the hidden cost q is not suciently high. The equilibrium in this case is not the same
as that in the economy with no moral hazard problem, because the cost of raising funds in the
economy with monitoring, ~Rf , is higher than that in the economy with no monitoring, Rf.
Consequently, if the degree of creditor protection is not suciently high, that is, the hidden
cost q is close to 0, the amount of investment, the probability of successful innovation, the
dynamics of technology gap, and the steady state of the technology gap in the equilibrium with
monitoring are, respectively, eNt 1
At
!
= (1 + m)
 
 1


(1 + )
 
 1
= (1 + m)
 
 1
Nt 1
At
; (40)
e = (1 + m)  1 1  
(1 + )
 1
 1
= (1 + m)
 1
 1; (41)
at = ~+

1  ~
1 + g

at 1  H2(at 1); (43)
~a =
(1 + g)~
g + ~
2 (0; 1): (44)
The following lemma establishes the properties of equilibrium innovation in the economy
with monitoring.
Lemma 1 Properties of the equilibrium innovation in the economy with monitoring:
32In Appendix B, I show that when nancial intermediaries monitor, the incentive constraint is satised
for all q. Thus, even if the degree of creditor protection is not suciently high, that is, q is close to 0, no
moral hazard problems arise in the equilibrium with monitoring.
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 The cost of raising funds in the equilibrium under monitoring, eRf , increases with the
monitoring cost, m; that is,
@ eRf
@m
> 0:
 The equilibrium amount of investment in innovation with monitoring, eNt 1, decreases
with the monitoring cost, m; that is,
@ eNt 1
@m
< 0:
 The probability of innovation in the equilibrium with monitoring, ~, decreases with the
monitoring cost, m; that is,
@~
@m
< 0:
Proof. The above properties are obtained by dierentiating (39),(40), and (41) with respect
to m.
The following proposition establishes the properties of the steady-state technology gap
when there is monitoring by nancial intermediaries.
Proposition 4 The economy with monitoring stagnates if the nancial intermediaries' mon-
itoring technology is too low:
@~a
@m
< 0:
Proof. By dierentiating (44) with respect to ~, I obtain
@~a
@~
=
(1 + g)g
(g + )2
> 0:
This implies that ~a is increasing at ~. From the lemma, I obtain
@~
@m
< 0:
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Thus,
@~a
@~
@~
@m
< 0:
Proposition 4 implies that the lower the cost of nancial intermediaries' monitoring, the
higher is the steady-state technology gap level, ~a. Lemma 1 explains why monitoring by
nancial intermediaries promotes innovation when the monitoring cost is suciently low.
First, when the monitoring cost, m, is low, the cost of raising funds, eRf , is also low. This
boosts the amount demanded for funds, eN , and the probability of successful innovation, ~.
When the probability of successful innovation ~ is high, the steady-state technology gap level,
~a, becomes correspondingly higher. By the denition of at ,(11), the high level of ~a implies
progress of innovation. Thus, Lemma 1 and Proposition 4 exhibit the eect of monitoring
by nancial intermediaries on innovation and economic growth.33
4 Dynamics
This section investigates the properties of the dynamic system. Consider an economy with
nancial intermediaries' monitoring.
The model economy's technology gap at 1 evolves according to the dynamic systemH2(at 1)
(43) when the degree of creditor protection q is close to 0 and there is nancial intermediary
monitoring. This dynamic system is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
Note that H2(at 1) is a linear function with slope between 0 and 1 and the vertical intercept
is ~. Lemma 1 implies that the lower the monitoring cost, m, the higher is the equilibrium
probability of successful innovation, ~. From Proposition 4, when ~ increases, the vertical
intercept of H2(at 1) rises and the slope of H2(at 1) declines. Consequently, when nancial
intermediaries face a lower monitoring cost, the system H2(at 1) shifts upward in Figure 1,
and the steady state of the technology gap, ~a, becomes correspondingly higher. Thus, when
33The relation between monitoring investment and economic growth is discussed in Levine (2005).
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Figure 1: An economy with lower nancial intermediaries' monitoring cost
nancial intermediaries face a lower monitoring cost, their monitoring can resolve the moral
hazard problem and promote innovation.
On the other hand, Lemma 1 implies that when the monitoring cost is suciently high,
monitoring becomes a heavy burden on nancial intermediaries, and it does not promote
innovation, although it might resolve the moral hazard problem. From Proposition 4, when
~ becomes lower, the vertical intercept of H2(at 1) declines and the slope of H2(at 1) rises.
Consequently, when nancial intermediaries face a suciently high monitoring cost, the sys-
tem H2(at 1) shifts downward in Figure 2, and the steady state of the technology gap, ~a,
becomes correspondingly lower. This lower steady state of the technology gap does not stem
from the credit constraints in the model with no nancial intermediary monitoring. In this
study, it stems from the nancial intermediaries' monitoring activities.
5 Welfare Eects of Financial Intermediaries' Monitor-
ing
In the previous section, I showed that increases in monitoring cost impede innovation and
economic growth. In this section, I examine the welfare eect of nancial intermediaries'
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Figure 2: An economy with higher nancial intermediaries' monitoring cost
monitoring.
First, consider the welfare eect on households in the economy with monitoring. House-
holds supply one unit of labor at the wage rate wt, which is used to nance their consumption.
Since perfect competition prevails in the nal goods sector, the wage rate wt is equal to the
marginal product of labor in producing the nal good. Thus, in the equilibrium, the wage
rate can be given by
wt = (1  )Zt = atAt; , where  = (1  )



 
1 
: (9)
The wage rate increases as the technology gap at increases. From Proposition 4, any increase
in monitoring cost lowers the technology gap at, since it leads to stringency in the nancial
market and so impedes innovation. Hence, increases in monitoring cost lead to lower wage
rates and thus worsen the welfare of households.
In each intermediate goods sector, only one entrepreneur can raise funds from nancial
intermediaries and invest for innovation. Moreover, the proportion of the sectors where
innovation is successful is t. Since the successful innovators can earn monopoly prot, At,
and the other entrepreneurs earn zero prot, from Equation (6), the prot earned by all the
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entrepreneurs in the economy can be shown as
tAt =
8>><>>:


(1+)

)
1
 1At, if no monitoring;
(1 +m) 
1
 1


(1+)

)
1
 1At, if monitoring:
(45)
Note that t = 
 =


(1+)
 1
 1
in an economy without monitoring and t = ~ = (1 +
m) 
1
 1 in an economy with monitoring, from Equations (33) and (41). From (45), it is
obvious that increases in monitoring cost lower the entrepreneurs' prot. As the eect of
nancial intermediaries' monitoring on the welfare of households, any increase in monitoring
cost leads to stringency in the nancial market and worsens the welfare of entrepreneurs.
In summary, although nancial intermediaries pay a monitoring cost in each period, both
the goods market and the nancial market take on the burden of monitoring costs and then
any increase in monitoring cost worsens the welfare of households as well as entrepreneurs.34
6 Conclusion
This study developed a Schumpeterian growth model with nancial intermediaries who mon-
itor the behavior of entrepreneurs in an economy with asymmetric information between -
nancial intermediaries and entrepreneurs. The main ndings of my model are as follows: (1)
nancial intermediaries do not need to monitor borrowers if the legal protection of creditors
measured by the amount of hidden cost is high; (2) monitoring by nancial intermediaries
removes the moral hazard problem but impedes innovation and economic growth if the mon-
itoring cost is too high; (3) a high monitoring cost worsens the welfare of households as well
as entrepreneurs through stringency in the nancial and goods markets.
Some studies examine the eect of the nancial system on innovation and economic growth,35
but they do not consider the activities of nancial intermediaries. The contributions of this
study are the introduction of nancial intermediaries into a simple Schumpeterian growth
34Note that nancial intermediaries live only for two periods and earn zero prots in each period.
35I introduced some of these studies in section 1.
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model and the provision of some implications of the eect of the behavior of nancial in-
termediaries on innovation and economic growth. After the recent nancial crisis, various
governments and institutions, including central banks, discuss the role of nancial intermedi-
aries and take measures for nancial intermediaries to boost economic growth. The ndings
of my model will be of some help to these discussions, although I have not included the
government or a central bank in my model. This topic is left for future research.
Appendix
A The derivation of Equations (19) and (20)
First, balance sheet condition (13) can be rewritten as
Bt 1 = Dt 1 +N
f
t 1   Lft 1: (13')
By substituting (13') and (15) into (17), I obtain
(1 + r +m)Lft 1 + (1 + r)(Dt 1 +N
f
t 1   Lft 1)  (1 + r)mLft 1  RdtDt 1 = 0
, mLft 1 + (1 + r)(Dt 1 +N ft 1)  (1 + r)mLft 1  RdtDt 1 = 0:
Then, I obtain
Rdt 1 = (1 + r)
 
1 +
N ft 1
Dt 1
!
  rm
 
Lft 1
Dt 1
!
:
In order to hold 1 + r < Rdt , which is determined by (19), I need
(1 + r)
 
1 +
N ft 1
Dt 1
!
  rm
 
Lft 1
Dt 1
!
> 1 + r
, (1 + r)
 
N ft 1
Dt 1
!
> rm
 
Lft 1
Dt 1
!
, 1 + r
rm
>
Lft 1
Dt 1
: (20)
Thus, I assume rule (20).
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In the case with monitoring, the incentive constraint is
 (1  ^t) q eNt 1 + ^t At   eRf eNt 1  eet : (46)
The right-hand side of (46) is equal to Equation (42), which is the entrepreneurs' expected
prots in equilibrium with the moral hazard problem when they use all the funds for in-
vestment under monitoring. The left-hand side of (46) is the entrepreneurs' expected prots
when they do not use all the funds for investment in period t-1. The rst term of the
left-hand side of (46) implies the entrepreneurs' expected benet when their innovation is
unsuccessful in period t, whereas the second term implies the entrepreneurs' expected benet
when their innovation is successful and they earn monopolistic prots, repaying the nancial
intermediaries in period t.36 Equation (46) can be rewritten as
q

1  (1  q) 1 ~


1  (1  q) 1
  (1 +m): (47)
The left-hand side of (47) is less than 1 since q 2 (0; 1),  > 1, and ~ < 1. The right-hand
side of (47) is larger than 1 since  > 1 and m > 1. Thus, I obtain
q

1  (1  q) 1 ~


1  (1  q) 1
 < 1 < (1 +m):
Hence, in the equilibrium with monitoring, incentive constraint (47) is satised for all q.
36Note that  is a discount factor, (1  ^t) q eNt 1 implies that (1  ^t) is the probability of unsuccessful
innovation when the amount of investment is N^t 1 and q eNt 1 is a private benet, ^t is the probability of
successful innovation when the amount of investment is N^t 1, At is given by (6), and eRf eNt 1 is the cost of
lending, where eRf is given by (39).
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C Proof of the second part of Proposition 3
Proof. ~a = (1+g)~
g+~
is given by Equation (44) and a = (1+g)

g+ is given by Equation (36).
Subtracting ~a from a, I obtain
(1 + g)
g + 
  (1 + g)~
g + ~
=
(1 + g)(g + ~)  (1 + g)~(g + )
(g + )(g + ~)
=
(1 + g)g(   ~)
(g + )(g + ~)
> 0:
The last inequality is obtained by  > ~.
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